Preferential Transactions: Potential Interpretations Based On The US Bankruptcy Code
The key challenge goingforward will be for theNCLT to adopt a purposiveinterpretation to the IBCprovisions on preferentialtransactions which strikes abalance between preventingunfair payments and ensuringthat lenders are willingto continue supporting adistressed business duringthe time when their supportis most requiredA fundamental objective of insolvency lawis ensuring pari passu (on...
The key challenge going
forward will be for the
NCLT to adopt a purposive
interpretation to the IBC
provisions on preferential
transactions which strikes a
balance between preventing
unfair payments and ensuring
that lenders are willing
to continue supporting a
distressed business during
the time when their support
is most required
A fundamental objective of insolvency law
is ensuring pari passu (on equal footing)
treatment of creditors of the same class. When
borrowers become financially distressed,
individual creditors are incentivized to press
for payment in priority to other creditors to maximize their
individual recovery. Borrowers themselves are incentivized
to prioritize payments to certain lenders (for example, those
who hold a personal guarantee from the promoters of the
borrower). Insolvency legislation in various jurisdictions, for
example, the United States of America ("US") and England,
describes such payments as "preferences" and allows for
insolvency professionals appointed over insolvent debtors
to apply to a Court to set them aside and recover the monies
paid out into the common pool available to all creditors
with unsecured claims in accordance with the legislative
order of priority.
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC")
has introduced provisions prohibiting "preferential
transactions" in Indian insolvency legislation.2 Resolution
professionals have a duty to report such transactions to the
committee of creditors and to file applications to set them
aside.3 The US Bankruptcy Code ("US Bankruptcy Code")
has contained similar provisions for a number of years. This
article considers the preferential transaction provisions in the IBC and how these might be interpreted based on the
US Bankruptcy Code and decisions of the US Courts. It also
briefly considers additional defenses available to creditors
in the US, which might be argued in India.
related party is potentially
problematic. For example,
bank lenders in India often
hold equity in borrowers
pursuant to the Reserve Bank
of India's Strategic Debt
Restructuring Scheme and
could fall within the definition
as a result. The US Courts
have adopted a pragmatic
approach in similar cases.
They have held that a lender
who has an affiliate with an
equity interest in a debtor
(a common situation in the
case of bank lenders) should
not be deemed an insider in
the absence of evidence that
the lender used the affiliate
to influence the debtor's
decisions
"Preferential Transactions" Provisions in
the IBC
Under the IBC, a liquidator or resolution professional may
apply to the National Company Law Tribunal ("NCLT") to
set aside a transaction made within a "relevant time" if the transaction: (a) is a transfer of property or an interest
thereof of the corporate debtor for the benefit of a creditor
or a surety or a guarantor for or on account of an
antecedent financial debt or operational debt or other
liabilities owed by the corporate
debtor; and (b) has the effect
of putting such creditor or a
surety or a guarantor in a
beneficial position than it
would have been in the event of
liquidation.4
The "relevant time" period is: two
years preceding the insolvency
commencement date in the case
of a "related party"; and one year
in the case of any other person.5
The term "related party" is
widely defined and includes,
for example; promoters;
directors; key managerial
personnel; entities related to
the aforementioned categories
of persons; "any person on
whose advice, directions or
instructions, a director…
is accustomed to act"; and
"any person associated with
the corporate debtor on account
of: (i) participation in decisionmaking
processes…; (ii) having
more than two directors in
common…; (iii) interchange
of managerial personnel…; or
(iv) provision of essential
technical information to, or from,
the corporate debtor".6
These provisions are similar to
the relevant provisions in the US
Bankruptcy Code, which provide
that a trustee in bankruptcy may
apply to set aside "any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property" which: was made to
or for the benefit of a creditor; was made on account of an
antecedent debt; was made while the debtor was insolvent;
was made within 90 days before the filing of a bankruptcy
petition or within one year if made to an "insider";
and enabled the creditor to receive more than it would
have received in liquidation.7 As such, US legislation
and Court decisions may be of assistance in predicting how
the NCLT will interpret certain
terms and adjudicate certain
issues.8 In particular, they may
assist with determining the
following:
- Whom the payment must
be made to - US legislation
provides that the recipient must
be an actual creditor.9 If a debtor
transfers property to a person
to whom it owes nothing, the
transfer is not a preference but
could be set aside as a fraudulent
conveyance.10 The equivalent
under the IBC would be an
application to set aside such a
payment as a transaction at an
undervalue.11
- Who can be liable to repay -
The US Courts have adopted a
wide interpretation (as appears to
be the intention under the IBC).12
For example, they have held that
this could include junior creditors
who have indirectly benefited
where a payment to a senior
creditor increases the value of
the junior creditor's interest in
the collateral.13
- Who would be considered
a "related party" – The wide
definition of related party is
potentially problematic. For
example, bank lenders in India
often hold equity in borrowers
pursuant to the Reserve Bank
of India's Strategic Debt
Restructuring Scheme and could fall within the
definition as a result. The US Courts have adopted a
pragmatic approach in similar cases. They have held
that a lender who has an affiliate with an equity interest in a debtor (a common situation in the case of bank
lenders) should not be deemed an insider in the absence
of evidence that the lender used the affiliate to influence
the debtor's decisions.14 They have also held that a
unique relationship with the debtor is not enough to
support a finding of insider status without additional
evidence.15
- When a transfer is deemed to have occurred – The IBC
does not state when a transfer will be deemed to have
occurred. This is of some importance in determining
whether the transfer in question falls within the
"relevant time" period. By way of comparison, the US
Bankruptcy Code provides that a transfer is deemed to
have been made: on the date it occurred if perfected
within 30 days; on the date it was perfected if this
was more than 30 days after the transfer occurred; and
immediately before a bankruptcy petition was filed if
it was not perfected before bankruptcy.16 Perfection
is deemed to have occurred when a transfer is fully
effective against third parties under the relevant state
law.17
Defenses
For the purposes of the IBC, preferences do not include the
following transfers:18
"(a) a transfer made in the ordinary course of the
business or financial affairs of the corporate debtor or
the transferee;
(b) any transfer creating a security interest in property
acquired by the corporate debtor to the extent that -
(i) such security interest secures new value and was
given at the time of or after the signing of a security
agreement that contains a description of such property
as security interest and was used by the corporate debtor
to acquire such property; and (ii) such transfer was
registered with an information utility on or before thirty
days after the corporate debtor receives possession of
such property."
Again, the US Bankruptcy Code contains similar defenses
for creditors.19 As such, the US Courts' decisions may
provide guidance on the following issues:
- Is "ordinary course of business" to be measured by a
subjective or objective standard – According to the US
Courts, it is the subjective standard of what is ordinary
between the parties.20
- What sort of payments would be within the "ordinary
course of business" – The US Supreme Court has held
this includes ordinary repayments of principal and
interest.21 As regards payments made pursuant to a
restructuring agreement, the US Courts have held that
this is a question of fact and depends on the nature of
industry practice.22
- Does "new value" include a creditor's forbearance
of its rights – While this is not a settled issue in the
US, some Courts have held that "new value" does not
include a creditor's forbearance of its rights.23
- The "earmarking doctrine" – If a third party provides
funds (either by way of a payment or a loan) to
a debtor to repay a specific pre-existing debt, the
US Courts would generally not treat this as a
preference if the funds were clearly earmarked for
this purpose.24 Their reasoning is that the payment
would not be to the detriment of other creditors
because the debtor could not have used the funds to
repay anyone else. The third party must have directed
the debtor to use the funds to pay the debt, and the
debtor must have had no control over how it could use
the funds.
- Subsequent advance of new value – Under the US
Bankruptcy Code, an unsecured creditor who extends
further unsecured credit or new value after receiving
a preferential transfer from a debtor may set this off
against the preferential payment.25 The purpose of this
defense is to encourage creditors to continue doing
business with the borrower while replenishing the
diminished estate.
The US also allows creditors the following additional
defenses, which might be argued by creditors in India faced
with preference challenges:
Conclusion
The IBC provisions on preferential transactions appear
to have incorporated best practices from different
jurisdictions, including the US. The key challenge
going forward will be for the NCLT to adopt a purposive
interpretation to these provisions which strikes a balance
between preventing unfair payments and ensuring that
lenders are willing to continue supporting a distressed
business during the time when their support is most
required.
2. "Fraudulent preferences" were prohibited under s.328 of
the Companies Act 2013. However, the new provisions appear substantially wider in scope.
3. §25(2)(j), IBC and §39(2), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016.
4. §43(1) and (2), IBC.
5. §43(4)(a) and (b), IBC.
6. §5(24), IBC.
7. §547(b), US Bankruptcy Code.
8. The wide variety of fact patterns in the preference area has resulted
in a substantial amount of Judge made law. For example, there are hundreds of US judicial decisions on what payments are considered to be made in the "ordinary course of business" (a defense available to creditors discussed further below). The decisions cited in this article are just a minor sampling from this body of case law.
9. §547(b)(1), US Bankruptcy Code.
10. §548, US Bankruptcy Code.
11. §45(1), IBC.
12. See the broad range of orders the NCLT may make if it determines there has been a preferential transaction under §44, IBC.
13. Gladstone v. Bank of Am. (In re Vassau), 499 B.R.864,872 (Bankr. S.D.Cal.2013).
14. Capmark Fin. Grp. Inc v.
Goldman Sachs Credit Partners L.P, 491 B.R.335 (S.D.N.Y.2013).
15. Clear Thinking Grp. LLC v. Brightstar US, Inc (In re KCMVNO) 2010 WL 4064832 at 4-5 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct 15, 2010).
16. §547(e)(2)(A) to (C), US Bankruptcy Code.
17. §547(e)(1), US Bankruptcy Code.
18. §43(3), IBC.
19. The "ordinary course of business" and "security interest in property" for "new value" defenses are in §547(c)(2) and (3) of the US Bankruptcy Code respectively.
20. Burtch v. Detroit Forming Inc (In re. Archway Cookies), 435 B.R.234, 240-245 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
21. Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991).
22. Arrow Elecs, Inc v. Justus (In. Re. Kaypro), 218 F.3d 1070, 1073-76 (9th Cir.2000).
23. United Rentals Inc v. Angell, 592 F.3d 525,531-35(4th Cir.2010).
24. Cadle v. Mangan (In re Flanagan), 503 F.3d 171, 184 (2d
Cir, 2007).
25 §547(c)(4), US Bankruptcy Code.
Disclaimer – The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the authors and are purely informative in nature.