The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens: SC

A Supreme Court bench of Justices Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi came down heavily on the State of Himachal Pradesh stating that, “To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution.”

The Supreme Court gave relief to an eighty year old Appellant who was illiterate and was wholly unaware of her rights and entitlement in law. The facts date back to 1967-68, when the State of Himachal Pradesh (Respondent) took over the land of the Appellant for the construction of a major District Road. The acquisition was done without taking recourse to acquisition proceedings, or following due process of law.

In 2004, some similarly situated persons whose lands had also been taken over by the Respondent–State for the same public purpose filed a writ petition before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh claiming compensation. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh ordered the State to acquire the lands of the Writ Petitioners under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act) and provided compensation to them.

On knowing this, the Appellant approached the High Court in 2010 and sought compensation under the LA Act or, in the alternative, direct the State to initiate acquisition proceedings under the LA Act.

The State argued that it had been in possession of the said land for the past 42 years and therefore the title of the State got converted into “adverse possession”. Further, the State argued that the land was utilized by the Respondent–State only after the Appellant and her predecessors-in-interest had verbally consented to the land being taken over without any objection. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant should avail of statutory remedy by filing a Civil Suit.

The High Court in 2013 held that the matter involved disputed questions of law and facts for determination on the starting point of limitation, which could not be adjudicated in Writ proceedings. The Appellant was granted liberty to file a Civil Suit.

The Appellant, aggrieved by the order of the High Court, approached the Supreme Court.

The Apex Court observed that the right to property is a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The Court also held that to forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right. The obligation to pay compensation can be inferred in Article 300A, though not expressly included.

According to the Court, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation – on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967 – which is her fundamental right.

The Court held that “In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.”

The Court was surprised by the plea of the State that it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, and therefore it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court.

The Court was of the opinion that condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably from the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. Period of limitation cannot be prescribed for the Courts when they are duty bound to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.

The Court concluded that the Appellant had been divested of her right to property without being paid any compensation for over half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law. The demand for justice is so compelling, since the State has admitted that the land was taken over without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure known to law.

The Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and directed the State to pay compensation to the Appellant.

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