Amendment To Pleadings In CPC: The Supreme Court’s Significant Ruling In Basavaraj V. Indira & Others

BACKGROUND

The two-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, comprising of Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Rajesh Bindal, deciding the case of Basavaraj v. Indira and Others¹, inter alia held that an amendment to a plaint cannot be pleaded at the fag end of the proceedings. Originally, a compromise decree was issued in relation to two parties (who were related to parties in the present appeal) by Lok Adalat, District Legal Services Authority, Gulbarg in the year 2004. But the respondents in the present appeal filed a suit for partition of ancestral property before trial court in Gulbarg in 2005. When the said suit was reaching its fag end in the year 2010, the respondents filed an application for amendment to the suit of 2005, seeking the declaration of the compromise decree of 2004 as null and void. The reasoning given for such a late application was oversight and mistake only. When the trial court dismissed the application for amendment, appeal was filed against the trial court’s decision before the Karnataka High Court. The Hon’ble High Court ruled in favour of the respondents, allowing the amendment application, and the present appeal was filed in Supreme Court of India against the same decision.

ISSUES

The main issue before the Supreme Court was- whether the application of the respondents seeking amendment to the original suit (filed in trial court in 2005), should be accepted or not?

JUDGMENT

The Bench ruled in favour of appellants, stating that the application seeking amendment cannot be accepted and the ruling was based on the following reasons-

1. Challenge to compromise decree-

a. Firstly, the Court observed that the respondents in the present case did not raise any objection against the compromise decree at the time the suit was filed by them for partition of ancestral property.

b. Relying upon Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) through L.R. Sadhna Rai (Smt.) v. Rajinder Singh and others², that the law related to challenge to compromise decree is well settled. The bench observed that a compromise decree cannot be challenged unless as provided under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3, C.P.C.

c. The Court perused the memo submission in the suit wherein amendment was sought and found that the parties to the compromise decree (Mahananda, wife of Basavaraj and Mahadevi, the wife of Shivsharnappa) were not parties to this appeal. As such, even if amendment application is allowed, the compromise decree cannot be set aside as the parties thereto are not present here.

2. Maintainability of amendment plaint-

a. The bench observed that unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial, no application for amendment could be filed after the trial commences. The burden of proof is upon the respondents in the present case to prove that in spite of due diligence, it was not possible for them to raise the plea for amendment before the commencement of trial.

b. Relying upon its own ruling in M. Revanna v. Anjanamma (Dead)³ by legal representatives and others, the Court opined that an application for amendment may be rejected if it seeks to introduce totally different, new and inconsistent case or changes the fundamental character of the suit.

c. Relying upon the cases of Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and sons and others⁴ as well as M. Revanna case⁵, the Bench observed that an amendment to plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C.⁶ cannot be accepted if it is found to be prejudicial to the interest of the other party. The Bench observed that the respondents failed to file an appeal against the compromise decree within the required limitation period, i.e., three years.

d. Referring to Article 59 in Part IV of the Schedule to Limitation Act, the Bench observed that the respondents failed to file an appeal against any decree within the required limitation period, i.e., three years. Since they failed to challenge the decree in prescribed time period, they cannot be allowed to challenge the decree via an amendment. In essence, what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.

ANALYSIS

The court rendered several observations regarding the legal framework concerning the enforceability of a compromise decree and the process of amending a suit subsequent to the commencement of trial. It unequivocally reiterated the legal significance of a compromise decree, limiting the scope of challenge available against such a decree, once it has achieved finality. Citing Order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and pertinent judicial precedents, the court emphasized that a compromise decree may only be challenged within the same court where it was originally issued. Subsequently, the court will review the validity of the compromise and the agreement reached by the involved parties on the basis of which the said compromise decree was issued.

Regarding the matter of filing amendments, the court established that no such application can be entertained subsequent to the initiation of trial. Additionally, amendments that fundamentally alter the nature of the suit cannot be permitted, nor can amendments that prejudice the rights previously decreed to the opposing party (the appellants in the present case, upon whom rights were decreed upon as a result of the compromise decree). Furthermore, the court reinforced the fundamental legal principle of common law, that "what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly," particularly in the context of challenging a compromise decree.

In this context, we find that the jurisdiction of Singapore is relevant to our discussion. In the famous case of Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan and another⁷, the Court of Appeals of Singapore ruled that law relating to amendments to pleadings either needs to be derived from the Rules of Court or needs to be based on the prevailing principles of common law. In other words, if another peculiar situation arises wherein a probable answer cannot be found in the existing law, the Indian courts can, and most probably will, refer to prevalent principles of common law.

Given that no decree can be challenged beyond the statutory limitation period of three years, the respondents' endeavour to challenge the decree through an amendment to the partition suit filed in 2005 cannot be permitted. Such allowance would effectively circumvent the Limitation Act and would contravene the fundamental doctrine provided in the Latin maxim "Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt," which signifies that the law aids those who are vigilant in asserting their rights, not those who sleep over them.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Basavaraj v. Indira and Others reaffirms fundamentally significant legal principles governing the validity of compromise decrees and the procedures for amending suits post-trial commencement. Reaffirming the importance of compromise decrees in India’s dispute resolution jurisprudence, the Court emphasized upon the scope of challenge to a compromise decree, within the court of original jurisdiction, as stipulated by Order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code and supported by relevant judicial precedents.

Furthermore, the Court confirmed the law settled around entertaining post-commencement of trial amendments, asserting that such applications must not fundamentally alter the suit's nature or prejudice rights previously decreed to opposing parties. Importantly, the Court upheld the principle that endeavours to indirectly challenge decrees beyond the statutory limitation period are impermissible, as they undermine the principles of legal diligence and the integrity of the judicial process.

By upholding these principles, the Court ensures legal certainty, fairness, and adherence to fundamental principles of Indian jurisprudence, thereby upholding the integrity of the legal system and safeguarding the rights of all parties involved.