Karnataka High Court: Power to Block Tweets & Accounts Under IT Act is Not Tweet Specific; Extends to User Accounts in Their Entirety

Karnataka High Court: Power to Block Tweets & Accounts Under IT Act is Not Tweet Specific; Extends to User Accounts in Their Entirety

The Karnataka High Court by its single Judge Justice Krishna S Dixit has dismissed the petition filed by Twitter Inc, challenging the blocking orders issued to it by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeiTY) under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act.

The Court imposed a cost of Rs. 50 lakhs on the microblogging platform, due to its conduct. Moreover, the Judge refuted to the request forwarded by Twitter to stay the operation of the order.

The Judge while pronouncing the verdict reprimanded the company and said, “Your client (Twitter) was given notices and your client did not comply...Punishment for non-compliance is 7 years imprisonment and unlimited fine. That also did not deter your client. So, you have not given any reason why you delayed compliance, more than a year of delay...then all of sudden you comply and approach the Court. You are not a farmer but a billion-dollar company.”

The Court held that the power Centre to block under Section 69A(1) the Information Technology Act read with Website Blocking Rules is not tweet specific but extends to user accounts in their entirety.

The Court had dealt with eight primary issues in the matter.

The first issue was related to locus standi. The Court noted that Rule 8(3) of the Website Blocking Rules in so many words mention about the mode of service of notice on a ‘foreign entity or body corporate’. It also recognizes the right of such an entity to reply.

The Court with respect to the argument forwarded by ASG that Indian law does not take cognizance of a foreign entity/company held, to be too farfetched and rejected the same.

“It hardly needs to be stated that many civilized jurisdictions across the globe allow foreign nationals & foreign entities to vindicate statutory rights in the domestic courts, even against the government & its authorities.”

The Court held that the Petitioner-Company is not only threatened of losing its protection available under section 79(1) but also penal action for violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act and the Website Blocking Rules.

Therefore, it ruled that the petitioner has locus standi to tap the writ jurisdiction of this Court for the redressal of its arguable grievance.

Second issue was with respect to inherent apprehensions of unfettered cyberspace and the ominous pervasion of social media in a democratic setup.

The Court noted that more or less similar concerns were addressed in the recently conducted Global Dialogue on ‘Internet for Trust: Towards Guidelines for Regulating Digital Platforms’ held in February 2023, by the UNESCO.

The Court held that these Guidelines encompass social intermediaries and focused inter alia on responsibilities of digital platforms with respect to human rights especially in the context of media literacy and intermediary accountability.

With reference to the third issue i.e., as to a brief and selective aspects of comparative law relating to takedown of objectionable cyber content.

The Court compared and analyzed the legislations of different countries including USA, UK and Australia and was of the view that cyber space is trans-national, that warrants advertence to some aspects of law on the subject as obtaining in a few prominent jurisdictions.

In connection to the fourth issue which was regarding certain aspects of native law and procedure relating to blocking of accounts, URLS and tweets.

The Court comprehensively explained that the Information Technology Act, 2000 is a Parliamentary statute enacted with a view to give fillip to the growth of electronic based transaction, to provide legal recognition for e-commerce & e-transactions, to facilitate e-governance, to prevent computer-based crimes and ensure security practices and procedures in the context of widest possible use of information technology worldwide. The Act applies to the whole of country and also to offences or contravention committed outside.

“A rapid increase in the use of electronic devices has given rise to new forms of crimes of several kind and therefore, penal provisions, subsequently, have been enacted,” the Court stated.

Averting to the present case, the Judge discerned that the Website Blocking Rules also provide for ensuring compliance with the Blocking Orders that are made by courts too.

Apart from the above, the provisions of Rule 9 empower issuance of interim orders of blocking in specific circumstances. Such orders must be followed by the final orders, as had happened in the case at hand.

The fifth issue was related to the competence of central government/designated officer to direct blocking of user accounts under Section 69a of the Act.

The Court distinguished between blocking of a user account and blocking of a tweet; in the former, blocking is ex post facto in the sense that the information is already available on the portal, whereas in the latter, the blocking constitutes an absolute embargo not only against the existing information but also against all future information that is yet to be generated and posted; this future information could be innocuous.

The Court remarked that the intent of section 69A of the Act is not merely penal and curative but also preventive.

“As of necessity, this provision has to be construed as empowering the Central Government to direct blocking of any information which may include an individual post/tweet/message or foreclosing of user accounts in their entirety, both of which are identified through a specific URL (address on the internet). Information may already be in existence or is yet to be generated, is true. The text, context & expanse of this provision give abundant scope for the argument that there is a lurking norm enacted to avert imminent harm to the societal interest at large,” stated the Judge.

The Court was of the considered view that State need not await the arrival of an avalanche of mishaps; it can take all preventive measures, in anticipation of the danger, more particularly when undoing of the damage is difficult, regard being had to its enormity.

Therefore, the Court opined that the power to block under section 69A(1) of the Act read with Website Blocking Rules is not tweet specific but extends to user accounts in their entirety.

With regards to the sixth issue relating to communication of reasons on which statutory orders are founded, the Court underlined that every decision of the authority should be reasoned and is the requirement of the principles of natural justice.

It was appositely stated by the Court that reasons are the living links between the material available on record and the conclusions drawn on that basis. When reasons are given for a decision, application of mind by the decision maker, is demonstrated.

Where the statute empowers withholding of recorded reasons, even then the authority must assign the reason for not sharing the reasons on which the order is founded. Almost invariably, it is open to the Court or the Appellate Authority to call for the records and check the reasons even when the statute provides for withholding of the same, the Court averred.

The seventh issue was with respect to non-communication of reasons on which blocking orders are founded and absence of nexus between the reasons and the objectionable tweets.

The Court was of the considered opinion that the impugned orders were speaking orders and there was a thick nexus between the orders and reasons assigned, and further that these reasons were disclosed to and discussed with the petitioner in the Committee meetings. That being the position, the contention of the petitioners regarding absence of communication of reasons, failed.

Lastly, the eighth issue was concerned with the petitioner’s contention of ‘failure to provide user notice.’

The Court referred to the Statement of Objections of the Respondents wherein it was explained that as to why no notice was issued to the users of accounts: the objectionable contents posted by them were anti-India and seditious.

The Court concurred with the submission of the Respondent that, “it is not desirable to issue notice to such users about the proposed action. Informing the user by notice will only cause more harm. The user will get alert of the same and get more aggressive, change his identity and will try to do more harm by either getting himself anonymous and spread more severe content through multiple accounts from the same platform or from other online platforms.”

Thus, the Court held that the petitioner being an intermediary, cannot invoke Rule 8(1) as a launchpad of its tirade, when apparently the said Rule is promulgated to protect the interests of only users of account and not others.

Therefore, the Judge was of considered opinion that notice to users of account in terms of Rule 8(1) of the Website Blocking Rules is not mandatory and that in any event, the absence of such notice does not avail to the intermediary as a ground for assailing the Blocking Orders.

Noticing that Twitter has completely de-platformed former US President Donald Trump’s account by permanent suspension citing public interest framework, the Court stated that this supported the case of respondents that a direction or blocking of accounts as an extreme measure can be given and there is nothing unusual in that. Petitioner has taken such a decision on its own and in terms of Twitter User Agreement, does not diminish its citation value.

Finally, the High Court dismissed the plea stating a Writ Court cannot sit in appeal over the subjective satisfaction of high functionaries of the Central Government in issues pertaining to sovereignty & integrity of the nation, security of the State and law & order, that essentially fall within the domain of the Executive.