Twitter Files Appeal in Karnataka High Court Against Single Judge Order Dismissing its Plea Over Centre’s Account Blocking

Twitter Files Appeal in Karnataka High Court Against Single Judge Order Dismissing its Plea Over Centre’s Account Blocking

Microblogging site Twitter (now X Corp) has approached the Karnataka High Court against the earlier order of a single judge which had dismissed its petition challenging blocking orders passed by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeiTY) under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act. The single judge Justice Krishna S Dixit had also imposed a cost of Rs. 50 lakhs on Twitter in its judgement on 30 June, citing its conduct.

The appeal filed by Twitter will come up before a division bench of the High Court by next week.

The social media platform argued that imposition of such exemplary costs is plainly unjust and excessive, and it effectively deters it as well as other intermediaries from challenging blocking orders that violate Section 69A or the Blocking Rules.

The company by way of interim relief, prayed for a stay order on payment of cost, which is due to be paid by 14 August.

“In case this Court is unable to render a decision on Appellant’s interim application prior to 14 August, 2023, appellant requests that the daily levy of Rs. 5,000, be kept in abeyance until this Hon’ble Court decides the interim application,” the appeal read.

The company in its appeal contended that if the decision passed by the single judge is upheld, the Union Government will be ‘emboldened’ to issue more blocking orders that ‘violate Section 69A, the Blocking Rules, and the procedures and safeguards mandated’ by the Supreme Court in the Shreya Singhal case.

Moreover, the company asserted that the impugned order failed to follow the plain language of Section 69A (1) that reasons must be recorded in writing in a blocking order. It erroneously holds that Section 69A (1) does not require blocking orders to contain reasons in writing, the appeal says.

Besides, the impugned order’s interpretation of Section 69(1) leads to redundancy of words, which is impermissible in law, it was contended.

The appeal also questions the order inasmuch it permits blocking of accounts as a whole, including all future innocuous content posted by those accounts. It reads, “The plain language of Section 69A (1) authorizes only the blocking of information that already exists, and therefore the Impugned Order should have applied a literal interpretation. It cannot justify adopting a purposive interpretation because the language of Section 69A (1) is unambiguous.”

It further alleged that the Impugned Order erroneously held that, although Appellant had locus-standi to bring a petition under Article 226, Appellant cannot claim the protection of Article 21 of the Constitution of India because it is not a natural person. According to Twitter, such an order was wrong because it contradicted the Supreme Court’s decision in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-J.) vs. Union of India (2017).

“The Impugned Order misstates material facts because it returns an erroneous finding that Appellant's ‘representatives who admittedly participated in several meetings of the Committee, never indicated to the authorities the grievances that are being now aired.’ This finding is erroneous because Appellant raised all of the relevant issues with the Rule 7 Committee and Respondents numerous times,” the plea stated.

The plea urged that the impugned order should be set aside because it ignored the respondent’s failure to comply with Rule 14 of the Blocking Rules. The order failed to apply the doctrine of proportionality that is an inherent part of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, which apply to Appellant, it was averred.