Supreme Court: Travesty of Justice if limitation of 5 years of Rajasthan Premises Act does not bar the suit even after 38 years

Supreme Court: Travesty of Justice if limitation of 5 years of Rajasthan Premises Act does not bar the suit even after 38 years

The tenant was able to prolong the proceedings for nearly four decades

The Supreme Court has dismissed a suit while dealing with the issue of the limitation of five years specified in Section 14(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950.

The division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah observed that the provision was for the protection of a tenant and the objective was that from the date a tenant acquired a right, he must have the right to continue in the premises for a period of five years, subject to his fulfillment of the terms and conditions of the lease.

The Court allowed the appeal stating that the objective of the Rajasthan Premises Act was subserved by the proceedings for the requisite period and beyond it, within which the tenant could not have been evicted.

The Bench observed that the decree of eviction passed by the first Appellate Court on 18.3.2004 should be affirmed. The respondent should be asked to hand over the vacant and physical possession of the tenanted premises on or before 30.09.2023 and call upon the respondent to file an undertaking to avail of the benefit for further occupation till 30.9.2023 within two weeks.

The respondent was the tenant of a shop owned by the appellant. The latter filed a suit for eviction on grounds of bona fide necessity before the Additional Civil Judge-I, Jaipur.

However, the suit was dismissed on a finding that the plaint was not in accordance with the Rajasthan Premises Act, which proscribed the filing of a suit for eviction within five years from the date on which the premises were let-out to the tenant.

The Trial Court found that the premises were leased only on 08.06.1982 by the predecessor in the interest of the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant succeeded in the first appeal before the Additional District Judge. It was based on the admission of the respondent that he had initially leased the shop from an individual Udai Lal in 1958. Thus, the suit could not be restricted under the Act.

The Bench disagreed with the respondent’s claim that the premises were leased on 08.06.1982. It noted that the original lease deed of 08.06.1982 had not been adduced before the Trial Court. On the respondent’s second appeal, the single Judge Bench of the High Court framed a preliminary question of maintainability on 04.10.2018. It found there was no ambiguity in the language of Section 14(3) of the Act, which created a complete bar to the filing of the suit.

The Judges stated, “While the suit may have been defectively instituted within five years of the tenancy, more than 38 years have elapsed since the suit was filed. This passage of time beyond the period of five years would wash away the initial impediment against the suit. We cannot lose sight of the fact that we stare at a factual scenario where the vagaries of litigation have prolonged the suit proceedings for a period of 38 years.”

They added, “The plea of the respondent is that the appellant should be asked to file a fresh suit – perhaps the confidence stems from the fact that if the tenant has already been able to prolong the proceedings for 38 years, a similar scenario would again follow. We are not able to countenance such an interpretation which would defeat the very purpose of creating an initial restriction on filing the suit. To say that the landlord should restart the proceedings because the initial period of five years had not elapsed, even as 38 years elapsed, would be a travesty of justice.”