Supreme Court rules against invoking Limitation Act Section 5 to extend time limit when less period set for specific purpose

Supreme Court rules against invoking Limitation Act Section 5 to extend time limit when less period set for specific purpose

Sets aside the order of the high court and restores the trial court order

The Supreme Court has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be used to extend the prescribed time limit when a lesser time is specifically provided for a particular purpose.

The bench of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia referred to Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, under which a tenant can file an application for protection against eviction.

The Act specifies that an extension of time for paying arrears of rent may be granted only once and for not more than two months. Section 40 of the Act states that the Limitation Act would apply to the proceedings and appeals.

The judges observed: “We have no doubt over the proposition that though generally the Limitation Act is applicable to the provisions of the said Act in view of Section 40, if there is a lesser time period specified as a limitation, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be used to expand the same.”

The case pertains to the respondent, a tenant in a shop in Calcutta, and the appellants, who were the landlords.

In 2005, the respondent stopped paying the rent, which led to the appellants filing a suit for eviction of the premises due to non-payment of rent.

The respondent filed applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Tenancy Act, for protection against eviction. Since these were not within the window of the statutory period, the trial court rejected the applications that were filed with a delay of 10 months.

The order was challenged by the respondent in the high court, which directed the trial court to dispose of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The respondent attributed the delay to improper advice by the advocate handling the matter.

The bench held, “A combined reading of the two statutes would suggest that while the Limitation Act may be generally applicable to the proceedings under the Tenancy Act, the restricted proviso under Section 7, providing a time period beyond which no extension can be granted, has to be applicable.”

The apex court also observed that in a tenancy dispute where there was no disagreement on the amount of rent, all arrears had to be deposited.

The judges remarked, “There is also a larger context in this behalf as the Tenancy Acts provide for certain protections to the tenants beyond the contractual rights. Thus, the provisions must be strictly adhered to. The proceedings initiated on account of non-payment of rent must be dealt with in that manner as a tenant cannot occupy the premises and then not pay for it. This is so, even if there’s a dispute about the rent.

The bench added, “The tenant is, thus, required to deposit all arrears of rent where there’s no dispute on the admitted amount of rent and even in case of a dispute. It must be done within the time stipulated and should accompany the application filed under sub-sections (1) & (2) of Section 7. The proviso only gives liberty to extend the time once, and not exceeding two months.”

The court observed that there was no dispute about the respondent defaulting in paying the rent. The respondent neither paid the rent nor deposited it. The reasoning that improper legal advice led to not paying the arrears on time was frivolous.

Thus, the bench held, “The mere allegation of absence of correct legal advice cannot come to the aid of the respondent. As if such a plea would give a complete license to a tenant to occupy the premises without paying the rent and then claiming he was not correctly advised. If the tenant engages an advocate and abides by his advice, then the legal consequences of not doing what is required to be done, must flow.”

The top court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the high court and restoring the trial court order. It also allowed the appellants to be compensated.