Section 10 to file or not to file
The article analyzes the evolving jurisprudencearound Section 10 and its interplay with otherprovisions of the IBCUnder the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016(“IBC”), a creditor or the corporate debtor itself,can initiate the Corporate Insolvency ResolutionProcess (“CIRP”) of the debtor. While financialand operational creditors can initiate corporate debtor’sCIRP by filing...
The article analyzes the evolving jurisprudence
around Section 10 and its interplay with other
provisions of the IBC
Under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
(“IBC”), a creditor or the corporate debtor itself,
can initiate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process (“CIRP”) of the debtor. While financial
and operational creditors can initiate corporate debtor’s
CIRP by filing an application with the National Company
Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) under Sections 7 and 9 respectively,
a ‘corporate applicant’ (which includes the corporate
debtor) can initiate corporate debtor’s CIRP under Section
10 of the IBC.
Since December 2016, many debtors have initiated their
own CIRP under IBC. This right given to the debtor is
very welcome as it gives an opportunity to the debtor to
bring about resolution of its insolvency in cases where its
creditors may be reluctant to do so.
In India, such a right to voluntarily initiate resolution
process existed even before the IBC, albeit in very different
forms - mainly as the right of an ‘industrial firm’ to make
a reference under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special
Provisions) Act, 1985 (“SICA”), for its revival. Admittedly,
SICA was a failed experiment for various reasons. SICA was
also routinely abused by the promoters who continued to
be in possession of the assets and enjoyed the unending
moratorium and protection provided by SICA.
Since admission of CIRP under the IBC also leads to
moratorium for the benefit of the debtor, the possibility of
abuse of Section 10 of the IBC by corporate debtors cannot
be ruled out. Nevertheless, Section 10 needs to be read in
light of Section 65 (fraudulent or malicious initiation of
proceedings) and Section 66 (fraudulent trading or wrongful
trading) of the IBC. This article analyzes the developing
jurisprudence around Section 10 and its interplay with
other provisions of the IBC.
Section 10 Requirements
Section 10 application can be filed by a ‘corporate
applicant’ (which includes the corporate debtor as also its
members and individuals in charge/control in certain
circumstances). Under Section 11 of the IBC, debtors
undergoing a CIRP or whose CIRP was completed 12 (twelve)
months preceding the date of the application or who have
violated a prior resolution plan or in respect of whom a
liquidation order has been made are barred from making
Section 10 application.
The trigger threshold for filing Section 10 application is low
– a payment default of INR 1 lakh or more by the corporate–
a threshold most companies, even if solvent, will not find
difficult to cross. However, while the trigger threshold is
low, the application requirements under Section 10 are
quite cumbersome, as compared to an application by the
creditors. To reduce the information asymmetry (between
the debtor and the creditors) as a part of triggering the CIRP,
the corporate applicant is required to provide extensive
information such as details of creditors, evidence of debt
and default, books of accounts, balance sheets, statement
of affairs etc.
NCLT’s Discretion To Reject Section 10
Application
A question arises that if there is a payment default and the
debtor is not barred under Section 11, does the NCLT have
discretion to reject the debtor’s application? Admittedly,
except for non-completion of the CIRP application, Section
10 does not provide any ground for rejection.
In the context of financial creditor’s application under
Section 7, in Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank1,
the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
(“NCLAT”) held that once NCLT is satisfied as to the matters
in Section 7, it is required to admit the case and beyond
that, it is not required to look into any other factor. If the
same rationale is applied, even in Section 10 cases, the
NCLT should not look beyond Section 10 requirements (i.e.
payment default and application being complete).
However, interestingly, NCLTs are issuing notices to
creditors under Section 10 and are hearing their objections
to admission of debtor’s application. Section 10 applications
are being heard by NCLTs in detail and debtors are being
asked to explain why their application should be admitted.
And there are at least four cases of rejection of Section
10 application by NCLTs on grounds that the debtor made
a filing with an ulterior motive to take advantage of the
moratorium provisions of IBC.
In Leo Duct Engineers and Consultants Ltd.2 and Antrix
Diamond Exports Pvt. Ltd3, NCLT, Mumbai noted that the
admission of Section 10 application will stay/stall the
proceedings against the debtor and its guarantors, and
this, rather than turnaround of its business, appears to be
the motivation of the debtor to approach NCLT. NCLT further
held that it is not sufficient to meet the requirements of
Section 10 and that it has to consider the merits of each
case and see beyond what meets the eye. NCLT dismissed
the application on the basis that irreparable loss will be
caused to creditors and admission will provide uncalled for
protection to the debtor and guarantors.
Similarly, in Unigreen Global Private Limited4, Principal
Bench, Delhi, observed that corporate debtors were trying
to abuse the IBC for only taking benefit of moratorium on
actions against the corporate and its directors. In Krishna
Kraftex Private Limited5, NCLT, Delhi observed that it cannot
mechanically admit Section 10 applications as it will
open a floodgate of people forming companies, incurring
expenses and then enjoying the moratorium. NCLT
further held that since no claims were made against the
company, the company cannot be declared to be in default
and that it barely had any assets which needed resolution
under IBC.
important tool in the hands
of corporates for resolving
their insolvency, the success
of this provision will depend
on how jurisprudence
around Sections 65 and 66
develops
Section 65
Under Section 65 of the IBC, penalties may be imposed on the
applicant if it initiates CIRP ‘fraudulently or with malicious
intent for any purpose other than for the resolution of
insolvency’ of the debtor. The section is peculiarly worded
as it stresses on ‘intent’ of the applicant linked to ‘purpose’
of filing - which, as per Section 65, should be ‘resolution
of insolvency’. However, the entire IBC proceeds on the
premise that a ‘payment default’ (rather than actual
insolvency) should be the trigger point for CIRP admission
as non-payment is viewed as an early sign of impending
insolvency. Therefore, Section 65 leaves a lot to subjective
satisfaction of NCLTs on what may appear to them as the
‘intent’ of the debtor in filing Section 10 application.
In the cases mentioned above, the fact that proceedings
were initiated/will be initiated against the guarantors or
directors appears to have weighed in heavily on NCLTs’
minds in determining debtors’ intent - NCLTs ultimately
held that the intent was only to seek moratoriumrelated
protections. However, the question is whether the
moratorium really gives protection to the guarantor or
directors of the company? Admittedly, a moratorium under
Section 14 of the IBC is imposed only for actions against
the debtor. In Schweitzer Systemtek India Private Limited6,
(where creditors argued that the debtor has filed Section
10 application to thwart their attempts to recover the
property of the guarantors), while NCLT, Mumbai recognized
that imposition of moratorium has been used to frustrate
recovery proceedings in certain cases, it admitted the
application on the basis that moratorium would prohibit
action only against properties of the debtor (not the
guarantors).
Further, even if moratorium applies, it only applies during
the CIRP period (which as per the IBC, cannot extend beyond
6 (six) to 9 (nine) months). Failure to approve a resolution
plan within such period leads to mandatory liquidation.
Importantly, during this period, it is the creditors (and not
the debtor) who are in possession and decide the fate of
the company. The creditors can take a decision to liquidate
the company or approve a resolution plan which could
entail sale of company’s assets or change in control. This
is very different from debtor in possession regime under
SICA where moratorium could be
enjoyed forever. Therefore, to a
large extent, the threat of abuse of
Section 10 seems unwarranted. It
is difficult to envisage a situation
where promoters would put
an otherwise solvent company
into CIRP and run the risk of its
liquidation or change in control
just to enjoy 6 (six) to 9 (nine)
months’ moratorium. And if the
company is insolvent, then let
the creditors who are seeking
recoveries decide the fate of the
company. The fact that moratorium
is sought by the debtor against
recovery proceedings cannot itself
be a ground to impute fraudulent/
malicious intent – especially when
the very purpose of CIRP is to
provide a calm period and prevent
dissipation of assets of the company during such period.
Section 66
Lastly, Section 10 must be read in light of Section 66 (2) of the
IBC. Under this provision, a director can be made personally
liable to contribute to the corporate debtor’s assets if before
the insolvency commencement date, such director knew or
ought to have known that there was no reasonable prospect
of avoiding the commencement of CIRP; and such director
did not exercise due diligence in minimizing the potential
loss to the company’s creditors. To make the director liable
under this provision, proceedings may be initiated before
the NCLT by the resolution professional.
Therefore, for the first time in India, directors can be made
personally liable for what is generally known as wrongful
trading or insolvent trading. Section 66 (2) is based on
‘wrongful trading’ provision of Section 214 of the UK
Insolvency Act, 1986. Wrongful trading occurs when the
directors have continued to trade past the point when
they knew, or ought to have concluded that there was
no reasonable prospect of avoiding company’s insolvent
liquidation and they did not take every step with a view
to minimizing the potential loss to the creditors. During
this time, the directors need to be extremely careful when
considering whether to continue to trade, or not. Importantly,
the liability is not for trading during this period but failure
to take steps to minimize the losses to the creditors.
Section 66 (2) of IBC will force directors of Indian
companies to evaluate what to do in case of
impending insolvency. The insolvency may be a
temporary issue in which case the directors may
determine that it is beneficial to continue trading, or the
directors may take some steps to improve trading conditions.
However, at a point when they realize that it may not be
beneficial to continue trading as is,
they must exercise due diligence to
minimize losses to creditors. Such
due diligence may be in the form of
taking steps for turnaround – and
it is in this context that the right
to initiate CIRP under Section 10
becomes important. If the directors
believe that a turnaround process
outside IBC is not feasible or proper,
then they must question if CIRP
under IBC will help in minimizing
losses to the creditors. If the answer
is yes, Section 10 almost takes the
color of a duty cast on the directors
to make an application for initiation
of CIRP of the company.
It may be noted that in the UK, while
deciding wrongful trading cases,
the courts place some weight on
whether the directors took professional advise (when the
company started going insolvent), and if so, what that
advise was. Therefore, it would be useful for directors of
Indian companies to seek professional advise on turnaround
mechanics to help them decide whether to file or not to file
under Section 10 of the IBC.
Conclusion
While there is some fear of abuse of Section 10, it is an
important tool in the hands of the corporate debtors when
deciding how to resolve their insolvency, especially in cases
where creditors are not interested or are dragging their feet
on deciding an outside IBC resolution plan. However, the
success of this provision will depend on how jurisprudence
around Sections 65 and 66 develops. While Section 65
provides a disincentive to file (considering the risk of NCLT
determining ‘malicious or fraudulent intent’ on the part of
the debtor), Section 66 provides an incentive to directors to
file (to avoid personal liability for wrongful trading). It may
be mentioned that some of the cases referred to above are
pending in appeal before NCLAT which is actively looking
at the question whether NCLT has discretion to reject
debtor’s application on grounds of potential abuse of the
moratorium provisions.
Footnote:
1. Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1 & 2 of 2017, Judgment dated 15 May 2017.
2. C.P. No. 1103/I&BP/NCLT/MAH/2017, Order dated 22 June 2017.
3. C.P.
No. 1104/I&BP/NCLT/MAH/2017, Order dated 20 June 2017.
4. Company Petition No. IB-39 (PB)/2017, Order dated 08 May 2017.
5. Company Petition No. IB- 78
(ND)/2017, Order dated 15 May 2017.
6. T.C.P. NO.1059/I&BP/NCLT/MB/MAH/2017, Order dated 03 July 2017.
Disclaimer – The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and are purely informative in nature.